Why Foreign Economic Assistance?
Vernon W. Ruttan* University of Minnesota There is general agreement in the economics literature that resource flows among countries in response to market incentives enhance global economic efficiency and welfare in both rich and poor countries. It has also been argued that in the presence of capital market imperfections the transfer of resources from developed country governments to the governments of developing countries on commercial terms, either directly or through multilateral agencies, can normally be expected to be welfare-enhancing in both developed and developing countries. 1 These arguments do not apply, however, to official development assistance that involves a substantial grant element.
Two arguments have typically been used in support of transfers that include a grant component. One set of arguments is based on the economic and strategic self-interest of the donor country. A second set of arguments is based on the ethical or moral responsibility of the residents of wealthy countries toward the residents of poor countries. Both sets of arguments have been the subject of continuous challenge.
I argue in this paper that neither the donor self-interest nor the ethical responsibility argument can be rejected on logical or theoretical grounds. I also argue that the empirical evidence in support of both the economic and the strategic self-interest arguments is exceedingly weak. The ethical responsibility arguments impose less burden on the empirical evidence. But, they have been subject to continuous challenge by political theorists and moral philosophers.
Donor Self-Interest
Donor self-interest arguments tend to assert that development assistance promotes the economic or political interests of the donor country. This argument is frequently made in official and popular pronouncements in defense of developed country aid budgets. 2 The donor self-interest argument has also been made by the critics from the left who assert that aid impacts negatively on political and economic development in poor countries. 3 The empirical evidence suggests that donor self-interest plays a relatively large role in bilateral assistance while recipient need plays a larger role in multilateral assistance. 4 
Economic Interest
Most economic self-interest arguments employ some version of the argument that aid promotes exports from and employment in the donor country. The crude version of this argument simply appeals to the obvious gains to the U.S. economy from exports of commodities or services or to the specific industries whose commodities or services are subsidized by the assistance program. U.S. producers of food grains benefit from food assistance, workers in the maritime industry gain from cargo preference provision, and U.S. engineering firms gain from contracts associated with infrastructure development projects. Programs to protect private overseas investment against economic and political risk have been a prominent component of U.S. and many other national assistance programs. 5 A somewhat less obvious appeal to specific interests often emphasizes the generalized role of aid in strengthening commercial ties between the donor and the recipient.
Commercial contacts developed during a period of assistance for the development of a nation's transportation or communication network can be expected to continue. As the recipient country's infrastructure develops, commercial demand for new and replacement equipment compatible with the aid-assisted investments is expected to widen commercial sales opportunities. Similarly, technical assistance for the development of an LDC grain milling and feed processing industry is viewed as enhancing the commercial demand for food and feed grains from the donor country.
A more sophisticated argument is often made that if aid is effective in contributing to LDC economic growth the effect will be an expansion of demand for those DC goods and services characterized by high import demand elasticities. agricultural producers are urged not to become overly concerned about loss of, for example, oilseed markets to Malaysia and Brazil because as incomes rise, growth in demand for animal proteins will generate demand for U.S. feed grains. Loss of exports by the mature industrial sectors will be more than compensated for by capital goods and high technology exports. 7 The first two arguments rest on relatively weak logical foundations. The use of assistance resources to subsidize domestic suppliers of commodities or services generally reduces the value of a given level of assistance to the recipient country. 8 This concern has generated a vigorous argument about the value and impact of food assistance. 9 Other areas, such as tied procurement of such services as technical assistance, have been subject to much less controversy. But there can be little question that the effect of aid tying is to raise the cost to the donor of providing whatever benefits recipients receive from development assistance.
The growth impact argument rests on stronger logical grounds. It should be technically possible to specify conditions under which government-to-government aid transfers involving a grant element could improve welfare in both donor and recipient countries. The empirical analysis to support this argument is, however, surprisingly limited. It is not sufficient simply to assert that the transfer of assistance resources may be followed by the growth of exports from the donor to the recipient country. The welfare gains and losses to donors and recipients must be calculated. As of yet neither the contribution of aid recipients' growth on donor trade balances nor the welfare gain and loss calculations have been made. 1 1 
Political and Strategic Interest
The view that development assistance is a useful complement to other elements of donor political strategy--that its primary rationale is to strengthen the political commitment of the aid recipient to the donor country or to the West--has been a consistent and at times dominant theme in the motivation for development assistance.12 Political considerations in both donor and recipient countries have, however, often made it advisable to cloak the objectives of short-term political or strategical assistance with the rhetoric of economic assistance--hence terms such as economic support fund in the USAID budget. 1 3 The strengthening of the capacity of Western Europe to resist external aggression and the enhancement of the political appeal of centrist political forces were major motivations for the Marshall Plan. The security rationale has not, however, been subject to nearly as rigorous theoretical or empirical analysis. It is doubtful that these forms of assistance are directly competitive--if food aid were reduced, the resources released would not become available to support the security assistance budget.
Ethical Considerations
Efforts to develop an acceptable rationale for development assistance have not been confined to self-interest arguments and rationalizations. There has been an extended argument about the moral responsibility of rich countries to assist in reducing poverty and enhancing economic development in poor countries over and above any considerations of self-interest.
But neither the advocates nor critics of foreign assistance have adhered to careful distinctions between self-interest and moral responsibility.
The typical criticism of foreign assistance starts out with an argument that the resources devoted to foreign assistance have been wasted--that assistance has not achieved either its intended economic or political objective. The argument then tends to be followed by an argument that in any event it is not legitimate, within the framework of Western political philosophy, for government to forcefully extract resources from citizens in order to transfer them to foreigners.22
Both the popular and official sponsors of foreign assistance have typically treated the ethical basis for foreign assistance as intuitively obvious. 2 3 There is, however, a substantial professional literature that has attempted to identify a basis in ethical theory or political philosophy for income or resource transfers made to enhance welfare in a recipient country even when the transfer is at the expense of a reduction in welfare in the donor country. In addition, since government-to-government transfers are often involved, an attempt is sometimes made to explore the basis for a claim by the recipient country for assistance or of the obligation of the donor country to the recipient country.
Entitlement
An argument frequently put forth during the "New Economic
Order" dialogue of the 1970s was that there should be compensation by the rich countries to poor countries for past injustices stemming from political domination and economic exploitation. This argument has been forcefully restated by Nozick, 32 and it has recently reemerged with renewed force in the debate over foreign assistance in the late 1970s and early 1980s. 3 3 It seems apparent that the emergence of social justice as a significant issue on the political agenda, both within nations and in international relations, is due to lack of confidence that the actual behavior of economic markets and political institutions adequately approaches the This argument goes beyond the "past injustice" resource entitlement argument discussed above. To the extent that it draws on the Rawls framework, however, it remains vulnerable to the weakness of attempting to derive rules of justice from an "imagined social contract." 3 7 I would personally prefer a stronger behavioral foundation on which to rest convictions about moral responsibility for assistance to poor countries. This preference reflects a more general skepticism about both the contractarian approach to political philosophy and the public choice approach to political economy that attempt to derive principles for the design of social and economic institutions from primitive assumptions about human nature.
A second level of argument insists that both the moral and rational arguments that have been used to support ethical responsibility for distributive justice apply to individuals (or families) and not to collectives such as nations. to be based on equating marginal utilities--the rich countries ought to give until the point is reached at which by giving more, the loss in utility in the donor country would exceed the gain in utility in the recipient country or countries. 4 3 However, the actual level of aid allocations by donor countries seems to reflect the much weaker moral premise that if it is possible to contribute to welfare in poor countries without sacrificing anything of moral or economic significance in the donor country it should be done. 4 4 There seems to be an implicit moral judgment among the citizens and governments of the rich countries that the moral obligation to feed the poor in Ethiopia is stronger than a moral obligation to assure a 6 percent rather than a 5 percent per year rate of growth in Ethiopian GNP. in their aid allocations--that recipient income levels do carry modest weight in the allocation of aid resources. 4 7 But we have little more than anecdotal evidence on the distributive impacts of development assistance in recipient countries. 4 8 Acceptance of responsibility for assistance does not resolve the question of what form of assistance to offer. The goals of assistance range from attempting to assure immediate "subsistence rights" or basic needs, 4 9 to assistance designed to strengthen the capacity of a nation to meet the subsistence requirements of its own people, or to modifying the institutions that influence the resource flows among nations.
On some grounds it would seem obligatory to secure some minimum level of subsistence before allocating resources to the other two objectives. But this conclusion is not at all obvious if the effect is to preclude either (a) expansion of the capacity needed to assure future subsistence or (b) reform of the rules of conduct that govern economic and political relationships among nations (i.e., reforming of the GATT rules on agricultural trade).
A fourth issue is the extent to which development assistance policy and administration should be directed to bringing about institutional reform in the recipient country.
The extent to which development assistance directed either toward meeting basic needs or to strengthening the recipient countries' capacity for economic growth will depend on the institutions that influence relations among individual citizens, economic and social organizations, and the government. Different institutional arrangements will influence how different socio-economic classes, different ethnic groups, and residents of rural and urban areas participate in programs designed to meet basic subsistence, health, and education objectives. Different institutional arrangements with respect to the organization and stability of property rights and the system by which the public revenue is generated and spent will affect the production decisions of farmers and the investment decisions of industrial entrepreneurs.
If a donor government's ethical concern extends to an obligation to assure the citizens of the donor country that the resources devoted to assistance are used effectively, either for immediate relief of subsistence needs or to generate longer-term economic growth, it can hardly avoid also entering into a dialogue with the recipient country about institutional 20 reform when it enters into negotiations with a recipient country about resource transfers. The rationale for focusing on institutional reform is the hope that the moral concern that provided a rationale for assistance will contribute to capacity in the recipient country to more effectively provide for basic needs and generate the growth necessary to improve the quality of life.
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The obligation to enter into a dialogue on issues of institutional reform imposes on the donor country the requirement to build the capacity in its own cultural and social science disciplines necessary to enter into the dialogue. These capacities should be guided more by pragmatic consideration about the potential impact of policy reform in the recipient country than either ideological considerations based on the donor's internal political processes or its own economic or political self-interest.
In Conclusion
The first conclusion that emerges from this review is the weakness of the self-interest argument for foreign assistance.
The individual (or group) self-interest arguments, when examined carefully, often turn out to represent a hidden agenda for domestic rather than international resource transfers. The political "realists" have not been able, or have not thought it worthwhile, to demonstrate the presumed political and security benefits from the strategic assistance component of the aid budget. Rawlsian contractarian theory does provide a basis for ethical responsibility toward the poor in poor countries that goes beyond the traditional religious and moral obligations of charity. It also provides a basis for making judgments about the degree of inequality that is ethically acceptable.
But the contractarian argument cannot stand by itself.
The credibility of the contractarian argument is weakened if, in fact, the transfers do not achieve the desired consequences.
Failures of analysis or design can produce worse consequences than if no assistance had been undertaken. 5 1 There is no obligation to transfer resources that do not generate either immediate welfare gains or growth in the capacity of poor states to meet the needs of their citizens. It becomes important, therefore, to evaluate the consequences of development assistance and to consider the policy interventions that can lead to more effective development assistance programs.
Since the 1950s our understanding of the development process has made major advances. But we can never fully know the consequences of any assistance activity or intervention into complex and interdependent social systems. Our limited knowledge about how to give and use aid to contribute most effectively contribute to development does not, however, protect us from an obligation to assess the consequences of either our strategic or development assistance or to advance our capacity to understand the role of external assistance in the development process.
